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NOTES
THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO POWER: A Shallow Pocket
I.

INTRODUCTION

The congressional recess for the Christmas holidays of 19701 has
acquired a curious legal significance. Shortly before the recess, the
Family Practice of Medicine Act2 was passed in both houses by nearly
unanimous votes3 and was presented to President Nixon on December 14, 1970.4 The President neither signed nor returned the bill.
The Administration maintains that the President's failure to act on
the measure before the recess has resulted in its absolute veto.Ii
However, several Congressmen allege that the act was not validly
vetoed.6 This allegation presents anew the question of the use
of the pocket veto power. The contours of this power remain uncertain despite previous Supreme Court attempts to define its constitutional scope.7
The Constitution 0£ the United States provides three methods
by which a bill, passed by both houses of Congress and presented to
the President, may become law and two methods by which such a
1. The Senate had adjourned from December 22 until December 28 and the House
of Representatives had adjourned from December 22 until December 29. S. Con. Res.
87, 116 CONG. R.Ec. S. 21180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1970); 116 CoNG. R.Ec. D. 1313 (daily ed.
Dec. 22, 1970).
2. S. 3418, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
3. It passed the Senate and the House of Representatives by votes of 64-1 and
346-2, respectively. 116 CONG. R.Ec. S. 15249 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1970); 116 CONG. R.Ec. H,
10953-54 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1970).
4. 116 CoNG, R.Ec. S. 21196 (daily ed. Dec. 28, 1970) (remarks of Senator Yar•
borough).
5. Letter from Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist to Senator Edward
M. Kennedy, Dec. 30, 1970, in 116 CONG. R.Ec. S. 21818-19 (daily ed. Jan, 2, 1971)
[hereinafter Rehnquist Letter]. The President contends that he also pocket vetoed a
private relief bill presented to him at the same time, H.R. 3571, 91st Cong,, 1st Sess,
(1969). In April 1971 a claim asserting that this private bill has become law was filed
with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. See Kass, The Pocket 'Veto: An
Elusive Bone of Contention, 57 A.B.A.J. 1033, 1035 (1971). This action creates the
possibility of Supreme Court review of the scope of the pocket-veto power.
Memoranda expounding the reasons for the President's disapproval of the two bills
in question are found in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1726-27 (Dec,
28, 1970). See also text accompanying notes 107-08 infra.
6. See 116 CoNG. R.Ec. S. 21195-96 (daily ed. Dec. 28, 1970) (remarks of Senators
Kennedy &: Yarborough); 116 CONG, R.Ec. S. 21817-19 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 1971) (remarks
of Senator Kennedy); letter from Senator Edward M. Kennedy to Professor Samuel
D. Estep, Michigan Law School, May 28, 1971, on file with the Michigan Law Review
[hereinafter Kennedy Letter]; Hearings on the Constitutionality of the President's
"Pocket 'Veto" Power Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong, 1st Sess. 2-3, 11-12 (1971) (remarks of Senator Ervin and
Representative Rooney, respectively).
7. See pt. II. infra.
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bill would fail to become law.8 One of the procedures resulting in a
bill's demise is customarily called the "pocket veto." A bill is
pocket vetoed when, on the tenth day following its presentation to
the President, he has not signed it but is prevented from returning it
with his objections to the house in which it originated because
Congress has adjourned. 9 The other type of veto created by the
Constitution may be termed a "return" veto. This occurs when a
President disapproves a bill and returns it together with his objections to the house in which the bill originated.10 The crucial distinction between the two types of vetoes lies not in the manner in
which they occur but in their effect upon the bill in question. Although a return veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of each
house of Congress, a pocket veto is an absolute veto. Once a bill has
been pocket vetoed by the President, it cannot be returned to the
house of origin for reconsideration. Therefore, a pocket-vetoed measure must be resurrected in the form of a new bill if its proponents
wish it to be again eligible to become law. The exercise of a pocket
veto thus gives the President far more control over the final status of
a bill than does the use of a return veto.11
The Constitution specifies that the pocket-veto power may be
used only if "Congress by their Adjournment prevent [a bill's]
Retum." 12 A number of ambiguities in this clause have contributed
to the uncertainty concerning the scope of the President's pocketveto power. One such ambiguity concerns the definition of the
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 describes what may happen to a bill after passage
by both houses of Congress. It provides in relevant part:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States;
If he approves he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections
to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections
at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together
with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law.•.• If any
Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted)
after it shall have been presented him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner
as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return,
in which Case it shall not be a Law.
Upon receipt of a bill, the President therefore has ten days excluding Sundays in
which to examine it. (Further references to the ten-day period in this Note will incorporate the exclusion of Sundays). Within that ten-day period, the President may
sign the bill, veto it, or do nothing. Thus a bill may become law by (1) the President
signing it within ten days; (2) the Congress overriding a presidential veto by a twothirds vote; or (3) the President failing either to sign or return it within ten days when
Congress is not adjourned.
9. See note 8 supra.
10. See note 8 supra.
11. While it is true that from 1789 through 1968 only 73 of the 1293 return vetoes
had been overriden, 957 bills had been pocket vetoed without any such possibility.
PRESIDENTIAL VETOES V (1969).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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word "adjournment."13 In its most limited sense, the word could be
used to denote only the termination of the two-year term of any
particular Congress.14 Conversely, an adjournment could be said to
take place at the end of each day that either house of Congress is in
session. It is unclear, then, which type or types of adjournment were
meant to create the possibility of a pocket veto. If, for example, an
adjournment of Congress at the end of each legislative day is construed to "prevent the return" of a bill to the house of its origin,
the President would obviously have the opportunity to pocket veto
virtually every bill presented to him, since Congress could prevent
a pocket veto only by remaining in session until midnight on the
tenth day after the presentation of a bill to the President. On the
other hand, the President's power to pocket veto bills would be
substantially limited if adjournment means that only the close of a
term of Congress would prevent the return of a disapproved bill to
the house of its origin.
A second ambiguity exists because, even given a conclusive definition of the word adjournment,15 the constitutional language does
not clearly indicate that every such adjournment would necessarily
prevent the return of a bill to Congress. Adjournments of the same
type may differ in length and it may be that the length of an adjournment, rather than the type, is the critical factor that would
prevent a return in the constitutional sense. If, for example, an
adjournment between sessions of Congress16 was defined to be the
only type of adjournment that prevents the return of a bill to the
house of origin, an anomaly would result if a recess within a session
13. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 63 (4th ed. 195'7) defines "adjournment" as "[a] putting
off or postponing • • • a session until another time or place; the act of a legislative
body ... by which the session or assembly is dissolved, either temporarily or finally,
and the business in hand dismissed from consideration, either definitely or for an in•
terval." (Emphasis added.)
14. The Constitution does not establish a specific term for the Congress. However,
U.S. CONST. art I, § 2 provides that members of the House of Representatives shall be
chosen every second year. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, as amended by amend. XVII, provides
that Senators shall be elected for six years and that one third of the Senators shall be
chosen every second year. From these provisions, tl}e custom of a two-year term of
Congress has developed. Since Congress is required to meet at least once each year
(U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 4, as amended by amend. XX, § 2), a term of Congress consists of
two sessions-one each year.
15. The constitution uses the words "adjourn" and "Adjournment" in various
contexts, none of which resolve the question concerning the adjournment to which
the pocket veto refers. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5 ("smaller Number [than a quorum] may
adjourn from day to day:" "Neither House ••• shall without the Consent of the other,
adjourn for more than three days''); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("unless the Congress by
their Adjournment prevent [a bill's] Return;" "Every Order ••• to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House ••• may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President''); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("and in
Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment,
[the President] may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper'').
16. See note 14 supra.
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of Congress, during which a return would be permitted, was of
greater length than an adjournment between sessions.
A third ambiguity stems from the use of the words "the Congress" in the clause "unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent [a bill's] Return."17 The apparent import of these words is
that an adjournment of both houses of Congress is required to prevent a return to the originating house. It is possible, however, that
"the Congress" should be construed to mean that an adjournment of
only the house of origin would suffice. The rationale for such an interpretation is a practical one: since the adjournment of the house
in which a bill did not originate does not in fact prevent its return to
the originating house, adjournment by the former should not be a
factor in deciding whether the return has actually been prevented.
Problems created by the uncertain scope of the President's
pocket-veto power do not often arise, but neither are they a matter
of purely academic interest. Indeed, two Senators who have questioned President Nixon's use of the pocket-veto power18 base their
challenge on the ambiguous language of the pocket-veto provision.
They argue that the pocket-veto provision was intended to apply
only in circumstances involving a final adjournment at the end
of a term or a session of Congress and was not intended to apply
to brief adjournments-such as the 1970 Christmas recess-occurring
within a session of Congress. 19 Senator Kennedy contends that the
President's pocket veto of the Family Practice of Medicine Act is
invalid and that the bill actually became law on December 25, 1970,
without benefit of the President's signature, since he failed to return
it on that date to the Senate with a record of his objections.20 It is
thus apparent that the unresolved ambiguities in the scope of the
pocket-veto power may bring into dispute the validity of a measure
asserted to be law by members of the Congress. When the contrary
view is taken by the executive branch, a resolution of the ambiguities is required. This Note will examine the circumstances under
which the President may constitutionally invoke the pocket-veto
power.

II.

THE JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK

Only two Supreme Court decisions have considered the issue of
the type or length of adjournment that will prevent the return of a
bill to Congress. The Pocket Veto Case21 was the first Supreme
17. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 7.
18. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
19. See letter from Senator Edward M. Kennedy to Attorney General John N.
Mitchell, Dec. 29, 1970, in 116 CONG. R.Ec. S. 21818 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 1971).
20. See Kennedy Letter, supra note 6.
21, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
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Court decision to delineate at least partially the constitutional scope
of the presidential pocket-veto power. The House of Representatives
had adjourned sine die 22 at the end of the first session of the
Sixty-ninth Congress on July 3, 1926, while on the same date, the
Senate had adjourned to a date certain.23 A bill originating in the
Senate24 had passed both houses and had been presented to President
Coolidge on June 24, 1926. On the tenth day thereafter (July 6),
neither house was in session. Presented with these facts the Supreme
Court had to decide whether the adjournment of both houses on
July 3 prevented the return of the bill within ten days and thus
resulted in a lawful pocket veto, or whether the bill had become
law since the President had neither signed nor returned it to the
Senate. The unanimous holding of the Court was that if, as a
result of a sine die adjournment at the end of the first session, Congress is not sitting on the last day of the ten-day period allowed the
President before he must return a bill, he has been "prevented" from
returning the bill to the house in which it originated.2 i; In other
words, it is not only the final adjournment of a term of Congress
that brings the pocket-veto provision into effect but also a final adjournment of a session of Congress.26
In reaching this decision, the Court was concerned that the
President should have the full ten-day period in which to decide
whether a bill should be approved or disapproved and, if the latter,
to formulate his objections for consideration by the Congress. The
Court attributed the pocket veto, not to the President's inaction,
but to the action of Congress in adjourning before the expiration of
the ten days allowed the President to return the bill.27 The Court
22. An adjournment sine die is literally an adjournment "without day." It is used
by both houses of Congress to mean a final adjournment at the close of either a session
or a term of a house and should be distinguished from an adjournment to a date
certain, a phrase used to denote an adjournment for a limited period of time within
a session of Congress. An adjournment to a date certain, by definition, can never be
used to close either a session or term of Congress.
23. 67 CONG. REc. pt. 11, at 12770, 12885, 13009, 13018, 13100 (1926). By the terms
of H. Con. Res. 39, the House adjourned sine die and the Senate adjourned until
November 10, 1926-the date to which, sitting as a court of impeachment, it had previ•
ously adjourned for the trial of certain articles of impeachment. 67 CoNG. Rr:c. pt. 8,
at 8733 (1926). On that date, the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, met and adjourned sine die. 68 CONG. REc. pt. 1, at 3-4 (1926). Despite the fact that the Senate's
reconvening on November IO was still within the first session of the 69th Congress, the
Court stated in the Pocket Veto Case: "That the adjournment on July 3 was in effect an
adjournment of the first session of the Congress is not' questioned." 279 U.S. at 672 n.l.
Thus, the Court treated both houses of Congress as having adjourned sine die on July
3, 1926.
24. S. 3185, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
25. 279 U.S. at 691-92.
26. In so holding, the Court rejected the position of the Committee on the Judiciary
of the House of Representatives that only the final adjournment of a term of Congress
would engage the pocket-veto provision. See 279 U.S. at 667, 680.
27. [I]t is plain that when the adjournment of Congress prevents the return of
a bill within the allotted time, the failure of the bill to become a law cannot
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explicitly rejected the argument that, despite an adjournment at
the end of a session, the President may still have the full ten-day
period in which to consider a bill because the bill might be returned
to the house of its origin, although not in session, by delivery to an
officer or agent of that house who could hold the bill and deliver it
when the house resumed its operations at the next session.28 The
Court noted the delay in reconsideration of a vetoed bill that such
a scheme would entail and commented that, until the house reconvened, a bill delivered to a congressional officer or agent would be
kept "in a state of suspended animation." 29 The Court concluded
that such a method of return "would not comply with the constitutional mandate"30 and "that the return of the bill should be an actual
and public return to the House itself, and not a fictitious return by a
delivery of the bill to some individual."31 Thus, a house adjourning
sine die at the end of a session of Congress was held by the Court
to be physically unable to receive the return of a bill disapproved
by the President.
The only other Supreme Court case that considered the scope
of the pocket-veto power was Wright v. United States.32 Wright concerned a bill33 that had originated in the Senate and was presented
to President Roosevelt on April 24, 1935. On May 4, the Senate
recessed until May 7.34 On May 5, the ninth day after the bill had
been presented to the President, he returned it with his objections
to the Secretary of the Senate. Both the bill and the President's
objections were presented to the Senate by its secretary when the
Senate reconvened on May 7-the eleventh day after the bill had
been presented to the President.35
Petitioner contended that since the bill had not been returned
to the Senate until the eleventh day, it had become law without
benefit of the President's signature. In rejecting this argument, the
Court noted that the Constitution neither expressly defines the requirements for the valid return of a bill nor "den[ies] the use of
properly be ascribed to the disapproval of the President-who presumably
would have returned it before the adjournment ·if there had been sufficient time
in which to complete his consideration and take such action-but is attributable
solely to the action of Congress in adjourning before the time allowed the President for returning the bill had expired.
279 U.S. at 678-79.
28. 279 U.S. at 683-84.
29. 279 U.S. at 684.
30. 279 U.S. at 684.
31. 279 U.S. at 685.
32. 302 U.S. 583 (1938).
33. S. 713, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1936).
34. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 allows either house to adjourn for not more tban
three days within a session of Congress without the consent of the other J:louse,
35. See 302 U.S. at 585,
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appropriate agencies in effecting the return." 30 The Court thus
concluded that there are no constitutional barriers to the accomplishment of a return by delivery to the secretary or clerk of the house
of origin if it is engaged in a recess of no more than three days. 87
In both the Pocket Veto Case and the Wright case, the Court
considered the practical difficulties posed by allowing the return
of a bill to an agent of a house.38 The Wright Court concluded that
if a house has recessed for a maximum of three days, no practical
difficulties result if a bill is returned to the house's agent.80 The
Court noted that during a recess of such brevity the organization of
the Senate con~inues intact, the Secretary of the Senate is functioning and able to receive the bill, and since the membership will
reassemble within three days it can act upon the President's objections with reasonable promptness.40 It also noted the familiar practice
of presenting a bill to the President during his temporary absence
by sending it to the White House to be held by a clerk until his
return, and concluded that allowing a congressional agent to hold a
returned bill for no more than three days pending the reconvening of
the house in which the bill originated creates no greater difficulty. 41
The Court dismissed the proposition that the practical difficulties
of a return to an agent of a house during a three-day recess should
preclude the possibility of such a return. The Court realized that,
if an argument to that effect was accepted, Congress would be denied
the opportunity to pass a bill over the President's objections. The
latter construction would "ignore the plainest practical considerations and by implying a requirement of an artificial formality ...
[would] erect a barrier to the exercise of a constitutional right." 42
However, in so holding, the Wright Court was careful to distinguish
the facts presented to it from the facts of the Pocket Veto Case. The
dangers envisioned in the Pocket Veto Case of a vetoed bill languishing in the possession of an agent of either house for "days, weeks or
perhaps months" between the two sessions of the same Congress43
were conceded by the Wright Court to have existed in the limited
context of that earlier case.44 But in the situation presented in
Wright, those dangers were dismissed as "illusory."4G
36. 302 U.S. at 589.
37. 302 U.S. at 598.
38. 279 U.S. at 684-85; 302 U.S. at 589-90.
39. 302 U.S. at 589.
40. 302 U.S. at 589-90.
41. 302 U.S. at 590.
42. 302 U.S. at 590.
43. 279 U.S. at 684.
44. 302 U.S. at 595.
45. When there is nothing but such a temporary recess the organization of the
House and its appropriate officers continue to function without interruption,
the bill is properly safeguarded for a very limited time and is promptly reported
and may be reconsidered immediately after the short recess is over. • • • If we

Notes
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THE "GRAY AREA" (ILLUMINATED)

As observed by Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist, "there is undoubtedly a legal 'gray area' with respect to the
question reserved in the Wright case-whether a pocket veto is
appropriate during an adjournment for more than three days by
one House of Congress."46 It is submitted, however, that the legal
effect of a pocket veto when both houses have recessed for longer
than three days within a session of Congress-the factual setting of
President Nixon's pocket veto of the Family Practice of Medicine
Act47-is similarly unresolved by either Wright or the Pocket Veto
Case.
The Assistant Attorney General concluded that because the tenday period in which the President could exercise a return veto had
expired during the congressional Christmas recess, when both the
Senate and House of Representatives had adjourned for longer than
three days, "the President was on very firm legal ground" in exercising a pocket veto. 48 It is his opinion that the general rule regarding the use of the pocket veto is stated in the Pocket Veto Case
while the Wright decision is an "exception to that general rule,"
which "is to be confined to the fact situation there presented."49
In fact, the Wright Court reserved the questions of the effect
of an adjournment of a single house or of both houses for periods
longer than three days. 60 The decision of the Court to follow the
common judicial practice of limiting a holding to the specific facts
of the case before it51 does not mean, however, as the Assistant
Attorney General seems to infer, that the Pocket Veto Case becomes,
by default, the statement of the general rule. Indeed, the Pocket
Veto Case was also considered by the Wright Court to be specifically
limited to its particular facts. 52 The holding of neither case is
regard the manifest realities of the situation, we cannot fail to see that a brief
recess by one House, such as is permitted by the Constitution without the consent
of the other House, during the session of Congress, does not constitute such an
interruption of the session of the House as to give rise to the dangers which, as
the Court [in the Pocket Veto Case] apprehended, might develop after the
Congress has adjourned.
302 U.S. at 595-96.
46. Rehnquist Letter, supra note 5, at S. 21819 (emphasis added).
47. See note 1 supra.
48. Rehnquist Letter, supra note 5, at S. 21819.
49. Id. at S. 21819.
50. [W]hile a recess of one House is limited fhere] to three days without the consent of the other House, cases may arise in which the other House consents to an
adjournment and a long period of adjournment may result. We have no such case
before us and we are not called upon to conjecture as to the nature of the action
which might be taken by the Congress in such a case or what would be its
effect.
302 U.S. at 598.
51. See, e.g., Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113
U.S. 33, 39 (1885).
52. The question [in the Pocket Veto Case] was whether the concluding clause
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authority for the Nixon Administration's assertion that a pocket
veto is lawful if, on the tenth day following the presentation of
a bill to the President, both houses of Congress have recessed for
more than three days but have not adjourned sine die at the end
of a session or term. Between the three-day recess, when a pocket
veto is impermissible, and an adjournment sine die concluding
a session, when a pocket veto may constitutionally operate, lies
the "gray area" of the legal scope of the pocket veto. Within this
unsettled area, three distinct situations could occur, each of which
would bring the constitutionality of a pocket veto into question.
Dispute might occur if a President took no action on a bill and the
ten-day period for returning it expired while: (I) one house was in
session but the house in which the bill originated had taken a recess
of more than three days; (2) both houses were in a recess of more
than three days; or (3) the house in which the bill originated was in
session but the other house had taken a recess of more than three
days. The constitutionality of a pocket veto in each of these situations
must be examined if a rational rule governing the use of the pocketveto power is to be formulated.

A. Recess of House of Origin
If the house in which a bill originates is in a recess of longer than
three days on the tenth day after the bill has been presented to the
President, it may be contended that the President's inaction results
in a pocket veto of the bill because such a recess constitutes an "adjournment" that prevents the bill's return. On the other hand, the
assertion that the bill has become law would rest on the argument
that, under the reasoning of Wright, the President could have delivered a return veto on the tenth day to the secretary or clerk of
the house of origin; 53 since a return was not made, the bill has
become law. This situation is thus identical to the facts of Wright 1H
except that the length of the adjournment of the house in which the
bill originated has here been extended beyond the three days a house
may recess without the consent of the other house. 61;
Whether a pocket veto in this circumstance would be effective
depends upon the interpretation given the pocket-veto provision.
Any such interpretation must consider both the explicit language
of Paragraph 2 of § 7 of Article I was limited to a final adjournment of the Con•
gress or embraced an adjournment of the Congress at the close of the first regular
session.••• The Court did not decide, and there was no occasion for ruling, that
the clause applies where the Congress has not adjourned and a temporary recess
has been taken by one House during the session of Congress. Any observations
which could be regarded as having a bearing upon the question now before us
would be taken out of their proper relation.
302 U.S. at 593 (emphasis original).
53. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
54. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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and the underlying purpose of that provision. 56 The first question
presented is whether the literal demand of the Constitution is satisfied. Did "the Congress by their Adjoumment" 57 prevent the return
of the bill? The Supreme Court held in Wright, in which only the
Senate had adjourned, that "'the Congress' did not adjourn. . . .
[T]he Senate is not 'the Congress.' " 58 This same argument would
be applicable here, and leads to the conclusion that the adjournment
to a date certain by only one house, for any length of time, can never
be an adjournment that prevents the return. This view would carry
special weight because the Court in Wright, after noting the "precise
use of terms and careful differentiation" in Article I, concluded that
the language in question
describes not an adjournment of either House as a separate body,
or an adjournment of the House in which the bill shall have originated, but the adjournment of "the Congress." It cannot be supposed
that the framers of the Constitution did not use this expression with
deliberation or failed to appreciate its plain significance. The reference to the Congress is manifestly to the entire legislative body consisting of both Houses. Nowhere in the Constitution are the words
"the Congress" used to describe a single House. 59
The Wright Court warned, however, against arguments of "extremely technical character." 60 Although the proposition that an
adjournment of only the house of a bill's origin is not an adjournment of Congress was clearly considered in Wright to be of substantive import, a future Court might regard the argument as a
technicality that should not be the basis for a constitutional decision. Such a view could be justified by reasoning that, if the meaning
of the word "adjournment" in the pocket veto provision is so illdefined, 61 the meaning of the term "Congress" may be equally uncertain. Consequently, while the use of the words "the Congress"
militates against a decision that an adjournment by only one house
allows a pocket veto, the language alone does not absolutely require
such a conclusion.
The purposes underlying the creation of the pocket veto must
also be considered in resolving the problem. The Supreme Court
has concluded that a construction of the pocket-veto clause should
not be adopted which would frustrate either of the following
56. "Like most of the Constitution, the simple words of the controlling clause
[art. I, § 7, cl. 2] carry the interpretation part way but do not automatically unlock all
the doors. The ultimate solution must, as so often, be sought through the principles
behind the language." Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624,
627 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
57. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, the relevant part of which is set out in note 8 supra.
58. 302 U.S. at 587.
59. 302 U.S. at 587-88.
60. 302 U.S. at 597.
61. See note 15 supra.
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purposes served by that provision: (I) that the President shall have
the opportunity to consider all bills presented to him for a full
ten days; (2) that the Congress shall have the opportunity to consider
and pass over the President's objections bills that he has disapproved. 62 A determination that the President may return a vetoed
bill to an authorized agent of a house that has recessed for longer
than three days would serve these purposes and be consistent with
Wright. 63 An unreturned bill would thus become law, "in like
manner as if [the President] had signed it." 64 A contrary determination, however, would prevent the Congress from considering the
President's objections and would eliminate any opportunity for
Congress to override the veto. Such a consequence, which would
frustrate a "fundamental purpose" 65 of the pocket-veto provision,
should be tolerated only if considerations of greater magnitude
would be served thereby. The only consideration suggested by the
existing case law that would support such an outcome is the fear to
which the Court in the Pocket Veto Case alluded, that, during a
sine die adjournment, unacceptable dangers would exist if a vetoed
bill was returned to a congressional agent. The perceived dangers
were that no legislative record would be made either of the return
of the bill itself or of the President's objections, that there would be
questions about the date of the bill's return or whether a return had
been made at all, and that congressional reconsideration of the bill
would be delayed. 66 However, the Wright Court felt that even though
such dangers might exist "when Congress has adjourned and the
members of its Houses have dispersed at the end of a session . . .
they appear to be illusory when there is a mere temporary recess." 67
It therefore concluded that the need for Congress to be able to override a veto outweighed the dangers. The Court in the Pocket Veto
Case had reached a contrary conclusion. To resolve the scope of the
pocket-veto power within the gray area, then, it must be determined
whether a recess during a session of Congress of longer than three
62. Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 486 (1932). This case held that a bill
signed by the President within ten days after it was presented to him, even though
signed after a sine die adjournment of the Congress that passed it, nevertheless be•
came law. See text accompanying notes 97-99 infra. The Court, in making its judgment,
gave weight to "the fundamental purpose of the constitutional provision" in question.
The reference was, of course, to the concluding sentence of U.S. CONST. art, I, § 7, cl,
2. 286 U.S. at 486, 493. Since the same sentence must be examined to analyze the
presidential pocket-veto power, the Edwards Court's observations regarding that pro•
vision's purpose are relevant to this discussion. The Wright Court, citing Edwards,
restated these dual considerations and concluded, "We should not adopt a construction
which would frustrate either of these purposes." 302 U.S. at 596,
63. See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
65. See note 62 supra.
66. 279 U.S. at 684.
67. 302 U.S. at 595.
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days, by the house in which a bill originated, constitutes such an interruption of the session of that house as to give rise to dangers that
would outweigh the mandate that Congress be given an opportunity
to override presidential vetoes. There are three possible outcomes
to the balancing of these competing considerations.
The first possible outcome would be a decision that the dangers
of requiring a President to return a bill to an agent of the house of
origin, when that house is in a recess of longer than three days, outweigh the desirability of allowing Congress the opportunity to override the presidential veto. Consequently, a recess of such length by
the house of origin would "prevent" the President from returning a
bill. If he did not sign it within ten days after receivng it, a lawful
pocket veto would result. This decision would be consistent with
Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist's view that Wright is an exception to the general rule of the Pocket Veto Case.fl 8 The weakness
of this position, however, is that it fails to recognize that the critical
factor in deciding whether a pocket veto is permissible during a
recess within a session of Congress is not the length of the recess, but
rather the length of that segment of the recess that extends beyond
the tenth day after a bill has been presented to the President. The
practical effect of Wright was a determination that the Clerk of
the House or the Secretary of the Senate can constitutionally
receive a bill from the President if the bill's house of origin will
reassemble within three days. No different result should be reached
when the return will be to an agent of the originating house-which
is in a recess with a total length of greater than three days-so long
as the house is likewise to reassemble within three days of the President's return of the bill. The failure to make this distinction is
a weakness that may be illustrated as follows: On Thursday, April
l, 1971, two bills are presented to the President, each of which he
lisapproves. One bill originated in the Senate, the other in the House
of Representatives. If neither house recessed, the President would
have ten days in which to return the bills with his objections to the
respective house of origin or each would become law without his
signature. However, on Friday, April 2, the Senate, with the consent
of the House, adjourns for twelve days until Wednesday, April 14.
The House, meanwhile, takes a three-day recess on Monday, April
12, to reconvene on Thursday, April 15. The President neither signs
nor returns either bill to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of
the House by Tuesday, April 13-the tenth day after their presentation to him. What is the consequence of his inaction? According to
Wright, a lawful return veto could have been made of the House bill
to the Clerk of the House on Tuesday, April 13. The Clerk would
68. See Rehnquist Letter, supra note 5, at S. 21819.
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then have held the bill for two days until the House reassembled on
Thursday, April 15. Since the President did not return the House
bill, it would have become law. The Senate bill, however, would have
been validly pocket vetoed because the Senate would have been in a
recess of longer than three days on the tenth day after its bill had
been presented to the President. A return veto to the Secretary of
the Senate on Tuesday, April 13, would not have been permissible
even though the Secretary would have had to safeguard the bill for
only one day until the Senate reconvened. This anomalous consequence, that the agent of one house might be allowed to hold a
bill for two days but the agent of the other house might not be
allowed to hold a bill for only one day, demonstrates the weakness of
distinguishing between recesses of three days and those of longer
duration. This result fails to make the subtle but important distinction between the total length of an adjournment and the number of
days that the congressional agent must hold the bill. For this reason,
it should not be adopted.
The second possible outcome would eliminate this anomaly by
permitting the President to return the bill to an agent of the house
of origin if the recess is to end within three days, irrespective of the
total length of the recess. It would reflect a decision that the dangers
of allowing an agent to hold a bill for three days are not sufficient
to outweigh the need for congressional opportunity to override a
presidential veto, but that the dangers of permitting an agent to hold
a bill for more than three days are sufficient to outweigh that need.
This outcome would be open to the criticism that there is no special
magic in the choice of a three-day period; if the clerk may safeguard
a bill for three days, why not for four or five or any other number
of days? The establishment of a "rule of reason" has been suggested
as a solution for this problem. 00 Under this approach, the determination whether the dangers of delay should prevent a return to a congressional agent would be made on the particular facts of each pocket
veto that was challenged. This proposal would itself create an additional danger, however: it would put in doubt the legal validity,
pending actual judicial application of the "rule of reason," of every
bill that was pocket vetoed by a President during a recess by the
house of origin that was to last more than three days beyond the tenth
day after the bill had been presented to the President. The uncertainty created would outweigh any advantages inhering in the
adoption of such a "rule of reason."
Finally, the third outcome would suggest that the holding of
the Pocket Veto Case should be strictly limited to its facts and
that the rationale of Wright should be extended to include all recesses of any length occurring within a session of Congress. The
69. 116 CoNG.

REC.

S. 21818 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 1971) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
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dangers of allowing a congressional agent to hold a bill for longer
than three days realistically are not great and thus do not outweigh
the need for Congress to be able to override presidential vetoes. It
would appear that the fear expressed in the Pocket Veto Case-that
if the return of a bill could be made to an agent of the house of
origin, there might be "no certain knowledge on the part of the public as to whether it had or had not been seasonably delivered" 70-is
now, with the widespread dissemination of news by radio and television, no longer persuasive. Contemporary media can easily inform the
public when the President returns a bill. Further, today (and quite
possibly in 1929, the year in which the Pocket Veto Case was decided) there should be no concern about the physical safety of a bill
or the ability of the congressional staff or leadership to inform
promptly all members of Congress of the return of a bill. The objection that a bill returned during a recess would be in a state of
"suspended animation" 71 is likewise not persuasive since even a return veto transmitted to a house in actual session is not assured
instantaneous reconsideration; such a bill may be tabled, sent to committee, or acted upon in the same slow fashion as other measures. 72
If, for some reason, immediate reconsideration of a returned bill is
desired, Congressmen can now reassemble in Washington within
hours. In addition, the Supreme Court has read as one of the controlling purposes of the pocket-veto provision "that the status of
measures shall not be held indefinitely in abeyance through inaction
on the part of the President." 13 This suggests a greater concern with
presidential inaction than with congressional delay in reconsideration.
This final outcome presents the most felicitous balance between the dangers of a bill's languishing in the hands of a congressional agent and the need to protect congressional prerogatives.
In the first hypothetical situation involving a presidential veto in
the gray area-when only the house of origin has adjorned for more
than three days-the conclusion is compelled that the President,
having chosen not to sign the bill, should be required to return the
bill to an agent of that house. If he fails to make a return within the
ten days allotted him, the bill would become law "as if he had signed
it."
B. Recess of Both Houses

In the second hypothetical situation, both houses of Congress are
in a recess of more than three days on the tenth day after a bill
70. 279 U.S. at 684.
71. 279 U.S. at 684.
72. See CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE
SENTATIVES 38 (1953).
73. Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 486 (1932) (emphasis added).
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has been presented to the President. The obvious distinction between
this situation and the first is that here, since neither house is in
session, there can be no dispute that "the Congress" has adjourned.
This constitutional requirement having been fulfilled, there still
remains the question whether such an adjournment "prevents" the
return of a bill to the house of origin and thereby permits the exercise
of the pocket-veto power. This question can be resolved by resort
to the same balancing process utilized earlier. Since the house in
which the bill originated must override a President's veto by a twothirds vote before the other house may reconsider it,74 determining
whether the President is prevented from returning a bill to the
originating house should in no manner be dependent upon whether
the other house is also in a recess of more than three days. The
balancing process thus operates in the same factual context as
previously discussed-the adjournment ,of only the house of origin
for more than three days. The conclusion follows that a return to an
agent of the house of origin is again permissible; and again the President would be denied an opportunity to exercise the pocket-veto
power.
C. Recess of Non originating House

The third possible adjournment posture of the Congress exists
when the house in which the bill originated is in session on the tenth
day after the bill has been submitted to the President, but the other
house has recessed for more than three days. It is difficult to imagine
any reason that could be offered to explain why the President should
not be required to return a disapproved bill to the originating house.
"The Congress" has not adjourned and the adjournment of the nonoriginating house does not prevent a physical return of the bill for
reconsideration by the house of origin. Accordingly, the President
should not be permitted to pocket veto a bill under these circumstances.
Even the holding of the Pocket Veto Case,76 concurred in
by Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist, 76 would appear to approve
this conclusion since the house of origin is in session and able to
receive a return veto. Consider, however, the practical consequences
of the following: it is possible that the returned bill could be immediately reconsidered and approved by a two-thirds vote of the
originating house. If this occurs, the Constitution provides that the
bill "shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House,
by which it shall likewise be reconsidered." 77 Since the "other House"
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2,
75. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
76. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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has recessed for an unspecified length of time greater than three
days, what is to be done with the bill until the other house reassembles? Obviously the bill could be held by the clerk of the
originating house and submitted to the other house upon its return,
or it might be conveyed immediately to an agent of the other house
for safekeeping uri.til that body reconvenes. In either case, it is unavoidable that if a return veto is immediately overriden by the house
of origin, the bill must be kept, by an agent of one house or the
other, in a state of "suspended animation" for "days, weeks, or perhaps months" 78 until the other house reconvenes.
The third adjournment hypothetical thus contains the same potential dangers of a bill remaining in the hands of a congressional
agent that existed in the first two situations. From his support of the
principle implicit in the Pocket Veto Case-that a presidential veto
may only be made by a return if the house of origin is actually in
session-it would appear that Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist
would allow the house of origin to receive a presidential return veto
even though the other house had recessed for more than three days.
By accepting this proposition, he accepts as well the potential dangers
that he was not ·willing to accept when it was the house of origin that
had adjourned, either alone or concurrently with the other house.
If, therefore, his construction of the pocket-veto provision were
adopted, it would be possible for bills to languish in the hands of a
congressional agent in the third adjournment situation but not in
the first two. In the interpretation urged by this Note, however, the
treatment of vetoed bills would be consistent, regardless of which
house was in recess-it would be clearly acknowledged that the Clerk
of the House and the Secretary of the Senate have full authority to
receive bills during recesses by their respective houses of any length
occurring within a session of Congress. This would mean that the
President would not be able to pocket veto a bill in any possible
factual situation falling within the gray area. The Wright holding
thus would be the statement of the general rule governing the use of
the pocket veto, with the Pocket Veto Case the only exception.

D. The Extension of Wright
It might be argued that such an extension of Wright essentially
undercuts the foundation of the Pocket Veto Case. This argument
would rest on tw'O grounds. First, to deny the possibility of a pocket
veto under the facts of any of the three possible adjournment situations in the gray area would ignore the warning-s expressed in the
Pocket Veto Case about the inherent dangers of allowing a vetoed
bill to remain pending for long periods of time without the possi78. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 684 (1929).
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bility of reconsideration by one or both houses. 70 Second, if Wright
is extended as suggested, the importance placed on timely reconsideration of a returned bill would be diminished and consideration
of a vetoed bill would be regarded with no greater urgency than that
accorded any other piece of legislation. And, since all legislative
business in both houses is carried over from one session of Congress
to the next "as if no adjournment had taken place,'' 80 the ultimate
extension of the reasoning of Wright would be to overrule the Pocket
Veto Case and to allow the consideration of vetoed bills to be carried
over into the next session.
Two arguments may be made, however, either of which would
support the extension of Wright. The first is that the Pocket Veto
Case should indeed be overruled. This conclusion would suggest that
the balancing previously used to justify return to the Secretary
of the Senate or the Clerk of the House when either or both bodies
were in a recess of more than three days would have the identical result if applied to the facts of the Pocket Veto Case. Specifically,
improvements in communications, security, and recordkeeping in
the forty years since the Pocket Veto Case suggest that even sine die
adjournments by either or both houses at the end of the first session
of Congress should no longer "prevent" the return of a bill to the
permanent congressional staff. With the increased workload of
Congress since 1926, the length of each session has expanded to the
point that a bill returned at the close of one session might be reconsidered at the start of the next with a delay of only a month or
two. 81
The second argument would allow the Pocket Veto Case to stand,
despite an extension of Wright to all recesses of any length occurring
within a session of Congress. This argument was not considered in
the Pocket Veto Case, but it is a rationale upon which that case
might rest. The initial sentences of the section in the Constitution
that contains the pocket-veto provision are concerned with the procedure for overriding return vetoes. If the President does not approve a bill,
he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall
have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their
Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. I£ after such Reconsideration
two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent,
together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall
79. 279 U.S. at 684.
80. SENATE MANUAL, Standing Rule XXXII, at 43 (1967); CoNSflTUTION, JEFFERSON'S
MANUAL AND Ruu:s OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Rule XXVI, at 471 (1953).
81. The sine die adjournment by the House of Representatives in the Pocket
Veto Case occurred on July 3, 1926. By contrast, the first session of the 91st Congress
adjourned sine die on December 23, 1969.
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likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that
House, it shall become a Law. 82
The final sentence of the section explains that a pocket veto of
a bill is to occur when "the Congress by their Adjournment prevent
its Return."83 It is submitted that the second inclusion of the word
"return" was meant to incorporate the same procedures for the
overriding of a presidential veto that follow the first use of the word
"return." The concluding phrase should thus be construed practically
to read: "unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its
Return, for such Reconsideration by each House, in which Case
it shall not be a Law." The significance of this construction is that,
given the facts of the Pocket Veto Case (session adjournment of both
houses of Congress), the word "prevent" would not mean a physical
prevention of "return" because the house of origin was not in session to receive such return-the interpretation adopted by that
Court. Instead, "prevent" would mean a prevention of reconsideration because the house in which the bill originated had ended its
legally constituted legislative session.84 This reasoning may seem
to lead to an improper conclusion because the life of Congress does
not end with the adjournment of the first session; it would appear
that a returned bill could be reconsidered after the Congress reconvenes. And, as stated earlier, the legislative business of both the
Senate and the House of Representatives is continued within the
same term from the first session to the second. 85 That has not always
been the case, however. The first terms of Congress followed the rule
of the English Parliament that business unfinished in one session
should not be continued by the next session. 86 Each session thus
began with new business only. The first modification of this practice
was made in 1818 when, in an effort better to utilize legislative time,
the House of Representatives adopted a rule that bills not disposed
of in the first session could be continued with the same status at the
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
84. The Court in the Pocket Veto Case specifically rejected the contention that
the end of the first session of a term of Congress may mark the termination of its
power to reconsider return vetoes. It stated that although there may be "an interim
adjournment of Congress at the end of the first session ... the legislative existence of
the House in which the bill originated has not been terminated ...." 279 U.S. at 681.
The Court thus believed that the crucial factor preventing return of a bill to its house
of origin was the physical absence of its membership caused by the adjournment.
"The House, not having been in session when the bill was delivered to the officer or
agent, could neither have received the bill and objections at that time, nor have
entered the objections upon its journal, nor have proceeded to reconsider the bill, as
the Constitution requires . . . ." 279 U.S. at 684 (emphasis added).
85. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
86. See CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 471 (1953).
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second session.87 It was not until 1848 that this rule was amended to
include the continuance of House bills that had been sent to the
Senate and not until 1890 that the rule was finally amended to its
present form. 88 Thus, consistent with the practice of noncontinuance
of legislative business which existed at the time the Constitution was
adopted, it can be argued that the framers specifically intended that
the adjournment sine die of the first session of a term of Congress
should deprive both houses of legal power to reconsider a vetoed bill
at the next session of that term. That the Constitution does not
specifically prohibit the Senate or House from amending their housekeeping rules to allow a continuance of all other types of legislative
business should in no way detract from the persuasiveness of the
suggestion that a prohibition on the continuation of reconsideration
of a vetoed bill from one session to the next was specifically intended
An adjournment of the first session of a term of Congress would,
then, as the Pocket Veto Case held,89 "prevent" the return of a bill to
the house in which it originated because neither house would have
the power, upon reconvening, to reconsider the returned bill.

IV.

COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The conclusion that the President does not have the authority
to pocket veto legislation when either or both houses have recessed
·within a session of Congress has been reached solely from an examination of the Pocket Veto Case and Wright. There are, however,
other sources that might aid in interpretating the pocket-veto provision. These include historical practice, the opinions of commentators,
official documents, and related state court decisions.
The view that the President may pocket veto a bill whenever
the house in which the bill originated is not in actual session on
the tenth day after the bill was presented to him has support in
actual practice. Pocket vetoes during a recess within a session occurred in the nineteenth century at least during the administrations of Presidents Johnson, Harrison, and Cleveland. 80 More recently, Congress acquiesced in a pocket veto by President Truman
during a two-month recess of the 1950 session91 and in pocket vetoes
during recesses of shorter duration by Presidents Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Johnson. 92
Additionally, attorneys general of the United States who have
expressed an opinion on the issue have apparently been unanimous
87. Id.
88. See SENATE MANUAL, Standing Rule XXXII, at 43 (1967); CoNsrrnmoN, JEFFER•
SON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Rule XXVI, at 471 (1953).
89. 279 U.S. at 680, 691-92.
90. See 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 277 (1943).
91. Zinn, The Veto Power of the President, 12 F.R.D. 207, 237 (1951).
92. See Rehnquist Letter, supra note 5, at S. 21819.
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in their support of the expansive construction of the pocket-veto
power represented by prior presidential practice. In what is perhaps
the earliest official interpretation, Attorney General Devens advised
President Hays that if Congress were to recess ten days after a bill
was presented to the President so that the President could not return the bill directly to the originating house as an organized body,
"the bill would not become a law .... [because] ... [t]here is no
suggestion that he may return it to the Speaker, or Clerk, or any
other officer of the House ...." 93 This conclusion has since been
concurred in by Attorneys General Miller in 1892,94 Sargent in
1927,95 and Biddle in 1943.96
Despite these supporting opinions by various attorneys general,
the practice of allowing the President to pocket veto a bill when
the house in which it originated is in a recess during a session of
Congress should not be given great weight in defining the scope of
the pocket-veto power. Custom does not estop the enforcement of
the Constitution. An example of the proposition that a final determination of presidential power may be made that differs from historical practice is the Supreme Court decision in Edwards v. United
States. 91 For nearly 150 years, it had been the practice of the
President to go to the Capitol on the last day of each session in order
to sign final bills that he intended to approve. This practice developed
because of the almost universal belief that the President had no
power to sign a bill after the sine die adjournment of a session or
term of Congress.98 The Edwards case dispelled that belief, however,
by holding that the President has ten days in which to sign a bill
after its presentation to him even if Congress ends a session in the
interim.99
Indeed, the presidential exercise of the pocket-veto power during
recesses within congressional sessions has not gone completely unchallenged. In 1868, the Senate passed a bill regulating the return
of bills from the President. It provided that the return of a bill to
the Senate or House would be prevented by a "final adjournment
of a session" of Congress but not by a recess within a session. 100 The
Senate also would have allowed the Secretary of_ the Senate and the
93. See 20 OP. A'ITY. GEN. 503, 505-06 (1892).
94. 20 OP. A'ITY. GEN. 507-08 (1892).
95. Letter from Attorney General Sargent to President Coolidge, Jan. 31, 1927,
quoted by Attorney General Biddle in 40 OP. A'ITY. GEN. 274, 278 (1943).
96. 40 OP. A'ITY. GEN. 274 (1943).
97. 286 U.S. 482 (1932).
98. See Zinn, supra note 91, at 226.
99. 286 U.S. at 492-94.
100. S. 366, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868), cited in the Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S.
655, 685 (1929). The passage of the bill seems clearly to indicate that the Senate was
of the opinion that the constitutional language was sufficiently ambiguous to warrant
clarification. For an argument that the Senate does have power to clarify constitutional
provisions dealing with legislative process, see Zinn, supra note 91, at 218-20, 242-46.
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Clerk of the House of Representatives to receive bills during a
recess. The bill, however, was never reported out of the House
Judiciary Committee.101 Some sixty years later the House Judiciary
Committee expressed its agreement with the earlier Senate view of
the pocket veto, by stating in a report to the full House that "the
adjournment contemplated in the constitutional provision relating
to presidential objections to bills and return thereof is the final
adjournment of Congress, not an interim adjournment." 102
Legal commentators have also supported the view that a pocket
veto is not appropriate during temporary recesses within a session
of Congress.103 As early as 1833, Justice Story wrote that, in his
opinion, the type of adjournment that would "render it impossible
for the president to return [a] bill" would be "a termination of the
session" of a Congress. 104 A similar sentiment was expressed in 1890
by a commentator who analyzed the origin, development, and function of the veto power and concluded that the possibility of a pocket
veto is created only by an adjournment at "the end of a session of
Congress" since "the provision is plain."105 More recently, a report
to the House Judiciary Committee expressed the belief that the
Wright decision indicates "a trend of reasoning which may ultimately recognize that an interim adjournment [within a session] does
not prevent the return of a bill."106 The author noted the new
presidential practice of preparing memoranda expounding the reasons for pocket vetoes and the transmission of these messages to
Congress for incorporation into the legislative journals. The report
concluded that, in light of this practice, there is "no logical reason
why the [pocket-vetoed] bill should not be eligible for reconsideration."107 The preparation of a memorandum explaining the substan101. See the Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 687 (1929).
102. 68 CONG. REc. pt. 5, at 4933 (1927).
103. The sole opinion discovered to the contrary was e.xpressed in a te.xtbook on
legislation. It was stated that ·
the theory followed by Chief Justice Hughes in the Wright case would seem to
compel a conclusion that if both houses by mutual consent recess for more than
three days that would be an adjournment of "the Congress" which would constitute
the sort of adjournment contemplated by the pocket veto clause.
H. READ, J. McDONALD &: J. FORDHAM, LEGISLATION 667 (1959). No reasoning was
expressed to support this conclusion, however.
104. 2 J. STORY, COl',lllIENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 888
(1st ed. 1833).
105. E. MASON, THE VETO POWER 113 (1890).
106. Zinn, supra note 91, at 237.
107. Id. at 238. To resolve the controversy whether a recess by one or both houses
within a session of Congress is an adjournment which prevents the return of a dis•
approved bill, the report proposes that the Congress avail itself of its power to enact
regulatory legislation in this field. The recommended legislation would define adjournment as "an adjournment sine die by both the Senate and the House of Representatives
terminating a session of the Congress." Id. at 243. It is believed that such a law would
"clear up the confusion from the Pocket Veto and the Wright cases and is in keeping
with a reasonable interpretation of the constitutional intent." Id. at 245.
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tive reasons for which a bill has been pocket vetoed indicates that the
President has had sufficient time to consider the bill's merits and
thus contradicts the rationale of the Pocket Veto Case that pocket
vetoes should be permitted because an adjournment restricts the
President's ability to consider bills and to "formulate adequately the
objections which should receive the consideration of Congress."108
The final collateral source that might aid in interpreting the
pocket-veto provision is state court decisions. The early state constitutional provisions permitting a pocket veto were quite similar to the
Federal Constitution's provision.109 Generally, the number of days
allowed the governor to return the bill was the sole difference between the federal and state provisions.110 The great majority of state
supreme court decisions construing the respective pocket-veto provisions held that the type of adjournment that will prevent a return,
and thus permit a pocket veto, is only a sine die adjournment of a
session or a term.111 Several of these state cases also held that a return
of a vetoed bill to an agent of the house in which the bill originated
is permissible.112 It is notable that several of these holdings have
now been codified in state constitutional provisions, which explicitly
limit the pocket veto to sine die adjournments.113
V.

CONCLUSION

An analysis of the authorities that have grappled with the pocketveto provision reveals that there is no significant reason that the
return of a disapproved bill cannot be made to the house of origin
108. 279 U.S. at 678.
109. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 4, § II (1876); WIS. CONST. art. v, § 10.
110. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 11 (three days); WIS. CONST. art. v, § 10
(six days).
Ill. State supreme court opinions that have held that a recess within a legislative
session does not allow the governor to pocket veto a bill are chronologically as follows:
Opinion of the Justices, 3 Mass. 567 (1791); The Soldiers' Voting Bill, 45 N.H. 607
(1864); Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189 (1870); Corwin v. Comptroller Gen., 6 S.C.
390 (1875); Miller v. Hurford, 11 Neb. 377, 9 N.W. 477 (1881); Hequembourg v. City
of Dunkirk, 56 N.Y. Sup. 550, 2 N.Y.S. 447 (1888); State ex rel. State Pharmaceutical
Assn. v. Michel, 52 La. Ann. 936, 27 S. 565 (1900); Johnson City v. Tennessee Eastern
Elcc. Co., 133 Tenn. 632, 182 S.W. 587 (1915); Municipality of Quebradillas v. Executive
Secretary, 27 P.R.R. 138 (Puerto Rico 1919); State ex rel. Putnam v. Holm, 172 Minn.
162, 215 N.W. 200 (1927); Wood v. State Adm. Bd., 255 Mich. 220, 238 N.W. 16 (1931);
State ex rel. Sullivan v. Damman, 221 Wis. 551, 267 N.W. 433 (1936); Hawaiian Airlines
v. Public Util. Commn., 43 Hawaii 216 (1959). Contra, In re Public Util. Bd., 83 N.J.L.
303, 84 A. 704 (1912); Opinion of the Justices, 54 Del. 209, 175 A.2d 405 (1961). See also
State ex rel. Corbett v. Town of South Nonvalk, 77 _Conn. 257, 58 A. 759 (1904).
112. The Soldiers' Voting Bill, 45 N.H. 607, 609-10 (1864); Harpending v. Haight,
39 Cal. 189, 203, 205 (1870); Convin v. Comptroller Gen., 6 S.C. 390, 398 (1875); State
ex rel. State Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Michel, 52 La. Ann. 936, 941, 27 S. 565, 567 (1900);
Johnson City v. Tennessee Eastern Elec. Co., 133 Tenn. 632, 643, 182 S.W. 587, 590
(1915); State ex rel. Putnam v. Holm, 172 Minn. 162, 169-70, 215 N.W. 200, 203 (1927);
Wood v. State Adm. Bd., 255 Mich. 220, 231, 238 N.W. 16, 31 (1931); State ex rel.
Sullivan v. Damman, 221 Wis. 551, 560, 267 N.W. 433, 437 (1936).
113. See, e.g., HAWAll CONST. art. III, § 17; MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 11.
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during a recess of any length within a session of Congress. The constitutional language that indicates that the return must be made "to
the House" does not have to be construed as strictly as some courts
have required. Support for this assertion is found in the fact that
courts have been more liberal in interpreting otl1er constitutional
provisions. For example, the same paragraph in the Constitution that
contains the pocket-veto provision requires that a bill after passing
both houses of Congress be presented "to the President."114 It has
long been the practice that delivery to the White House in the
President's absence is regarded as an effective presentation.m If the
words "the President" can be construed to mean one of his aides,
the same construction can certainly be given to the words "the
House." It is, after all, a Constitution that is being expounded.110
What emerges from a study of the pocket-veto provision is the
conclusion that the provision was inserted in the Constitution to
safeguard the right of the President to have sufficient time to give
all bills careful examination and to return those which he disapproves. So long as the President is accorded a full ten days before
he must return a disapproved bill to its house of origin, this right
is not abridged. If an agent of the house of origin is permitted to
accept the return of a bill, it becomes irrelevant that on the tenth
day after the President has received a bill either or both houses are
in a recess of more than three days. The right of Congress to override a presidential veto is too important to be subordinated to
an alleged mandate that a vetoed bill must be reconsidered immediately. It would be a severe distortion of the intended distribution of governmental powers if, under the guise of protecting the
constitutional right to a full ten days to consider a bill, the President acquires an absolute veto power because of the fortuitous circumstance of an untimely congressional recess. A framework of checks
and balances should not be held to rest on such niceties. An interpretation of the pocket-veto clause that allows only a sine die adjournment of a session or term of Congress to prevent the return of
a bill would protect both presidential and congressional prerogatives
in the making of law.117 Such an interpretation would mean that
President Nixon was without the constitutional power to pocket veto
the Family Practice of Medicine Act. That Act should now be law
"in like Manner as if he had signed it."
114. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
115. See Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 590 (1937). Cf. Eber Bros. Wine &:
Liquor Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624, 629 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
116. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (Marshall, J.).
117. Bills embodying such an interpretation of the pocket-veto clause have been
introduced by Senator Ervin and Representatives Celler and McCulloch. S. 1642, 92d
Cong., 1st Scss. (1971); H.R. 6225, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).

